Introduction
Demonetisation has been the contentious issue in Indian politics ever since the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, declared that Rs 500 and Rs 1000 notes would cease to be legal tenders from midnight of 8 th Nov 2016. Demonetisation or the withdrawal of form of currency from circulation is nothing unique as many countries have done it. In 2002 the nations of the European Union began to use to common currency of Euro and demonetised the old national currencies such as mark, franc and lira. In 2015, Zimbabwe demonetized its currency in response to hyperinflation. The Indian exercise, however, stands distinct to other economies due to the suddenness of the decision as the declaration and its implementation occurred in a matter of hours. The abruptness was compounded by the volume of the exercise as 86 percent of all legal tender in the country was demonetised and cash transactions constituted nearly 80 percent of all economic transactions in the country (Ghosh 2016) . Naturally the decision and its implications have dominated political and electoral discourse of the country (Express Web Desk 2016) . This paper of attempts to provide an overview of the politics associated with demonetisation in India. It presents the experience of demonetisation along with the various narratives, both in favour and against, the move of demonetisation. Interestingly the debate surrounding demonetization has been largely confined to the cost benefit analysis, and economic merit-demerit. This paper shifts the focus from economic to political dimensions of demonetisation and argues that in the absence of comprehensible economic consequences, the narrative of demonetisation is dominantly constructed by political parties.
Although demonetization is essentially an economic instrumentality, in the Indian context it has been reduced to purely political rhetoric. 1 Assistant Professor, Presidency University, Índia. E-mail: zaad.mahmood@gmail.com
Demonetisation experience in India
In economic literature demonetisation is presented as a measure to combat corruption (tax evasion), fake currency, inflation and to facilitate cash less transaction and trade. The Government of India also broadly presented the same reasons behind its decision of demonetisation. The Government justified the move as part of its battle against corruption to limit parallel economy, prevent counterfeit currency, curbing subversive activities and increasing tax revenue (Express Web Desk 2016 As some financial experts predict the move will have strong 'formalisation effect' and nearly half of the non-tax paying businesses in the informal sector will become unviable and cede market shares to the organised sector (Worstall 2016) . It is also expected that given the huge inflow of capital into banks, lending interest rates would decline that may have a stimulatory effect on economic growth in the long run.
Empirically, demonetisation has forced people to deposit money into the banks with long queues noted across the country.
In this narrative the non-deposit of unaccounted currency has emerged as a key political issue.
During demonetization it was claimed that the government would gain a windfall profit due to non-deposit of some amount of black money for fear to sanction. According to statements, the government expected around Rs 4-6 trillion not to return to the banks. This amount once transferred to the government by the Central Bank would enable tax cuts, bank recapitalisation and infrastructure spending (Roychoudhury 2016) . It is noteworthy that even after 100 days and the presentation of the national budget the government has not disclosed the amount of non-deposited currency. News reports however, suggest that around 97 per cent of currency notes, outlawed by the government have returned to banks raising serious questions on the short term benefits of demonetisation (Express Web Desk 2017) .
Critics have also raised questions about fake currency as a reason for demonetisation. According to the Reserve Bank of India data only seven notes in every million were detected as fake in 2015-16. In terms of value, the fake notes constituted Rs 296.4 million in value out of the total Rs16.41 trillion worth currency in circulation . This amounts to a miniscule .0018 percent of the total value of currency and demonetisation of entire currency is akin to throwing the baby with the bathwater. Even the most conservative estimates of genuine currency notes suggest that only 250 notes in every million are fake (joint study by the Indian Statistical Institute and National Investigation Agency).
In contrast to the gains associated with demonetisation, the detrimental effects in the form of severe cash shortages for small businesses, agriculture, transportation and the informal sector have been immediate. People seeking to exchange their notes had to stand in lengthy queues, a process by made challenging by inefficient planning and unequal banking access (IANS 2016). As pointed out by several prominent economists over 90 percent of all transactions in India are conducted in cash, and over 85 percent of workers get their incomes in cash which made the impact all pervasive (Ghosh 2016) . The number of deaths associated with demonetisation (either due to lack of medical help due to cash shortage or death due to stress of queueing for withdrawal from banks) has touched the three digit figure (Worstall 2016) . At a macro-economic level both growth and investment have been adversely affected due to demonetisation. Equity research firms have estimated that the liquidity crisis will result in GDP growth decline between 0.5 percent to 2 percent in the fiscal year (Worstall 2016 Intuitively the cost of demonetisation till now, far outweighs the benefits. The visible benefit has been the fillip to cash less transactions in the economy. The demand for point of sales (POS) machines and transactions through E-payment options have increased significantly (Economic Times 2016). According to data of Pine Labs, the debit card transactions rose by 108 percent and credit card transactions by 60 percent on 9 November 2016. Undeniably this is a move towards greater formalisation of economic transactions. In contrast, the cost of the process has been enormous, at least in economic terms. According to CMIE just the cost of withdrawing 500 and 1000 currency notes was conservatively around 1.28 trillion rupees till December 30, the deadline set for currency swap by the government. This cost is likely to go up over time due to the overall loss of liquidity, broken supply chains and loss of confidence in consumers ( ET Bureau 2016) .
Surprisingly the political cost of the move has been favourable for the Prime Minister and the government. Since demonetisation the incumbent centre wing BhartiyaJanta Party (BJP) has formed government in 4 out of the 5 sub-national states that went to polls. This success comes close on the heels of victory in the civic polls in Odisha, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Chandigarh. In Chandigarh the BJP won 20 out of total 26 seats, in Maharashtra BJP increased its seat tally from 25 seats to 119, in Gujarat BJP maintained its lead on 23 out of 31 other seats of various municipalities, and panchayats, and in Rajasthan the party won 19 seats out of 37 seats (Shekhar 2016) . A natural question in this context is how despite the apparent limitations of demonetisation in economic domain and hardships for the common people, the government and the Prime Minister can elicit political mileage and electoral success.
Interestingly in the available narrative on demonetisation, the political dimension of the process has remained relatively unexplored. Questions about political strategy behind the decision has not been interrogated adequately . Such questions are necessitated by the fact that incumbent BJP has largely been identified as the party of upper caste, traders-small and middle-level businessmen (Chhibber 1997) . The move has implications for business especially small and medium ones in the short run, and betrays the political decision making horizon (gains in long term future with immediate costs).
Politics of demonetisation
The decision of demonetisation has been contested and divisive. The winter session of the parliament saw little work due to protests by opposition, a Bharat bandh (All India strike) called by Left parties (HT Correspondents 2016) along with spate of protests across the country (Daniyal 2016) . As the economic gains from demonetisation remain unsure, it is the political narrative of the process that has acquired prominence.
In this battle of political narratives, Prime Minister Modi and the government have positioned demonetisation at a moral plane as a battle against corruption. People sympathetic to Narendra Modi argue that the idea of demonetisation in principle was necessary and difficult, but it was marred by inept implementation and corruption. The upsurge in Jan-Dhan accounts (zero balance accounts opened by the government for the poor) post demonetisation is alleged to be one of means of money laundering. The implementation of demonetisation however reveals flaws in policy beyond adoption of unscrupulous means by people such as difference in the size of currencies requiring recalibration of ATMS, and inadequate currency printing leading to severe inconvenience. Critics have argued that these point to the lack of policy analysis, cost-benefit analysis, or consideration of alternative policy.
Decision of demonetisation
Intuitively, the policy of demonetisation, as it has unfolded is more a political process than a considered economic calculus. The gain from the demonetisation exercise, particularly to the Prime Minister is more than evident. Corruption was a significant electoral issue in the 2014 elections, and one of the key electoral promises of Modi was to bring back black money stashed in Swiss banks. In one stroke he has presented himself as the leader waging a battle against corruption. The PM claimed that the difficult decision of demonetisation was necessitated by the inaction of all previous leaders to tackle the corrupt.
The move was also carefully presented as the bold and uncompromising, characteristics that complement the leadership style of Modi. The success of this political posturing is evident when the Prime Minister is hailed by Singapore-based paper The Independent as a Lee Kuan Yew to stamp out corruption in India (The Independent 2016). According to noted sociologist AsishNandy Modi is pushed by his intense desire to do something, to leave his mark in history and radical demonetisation could be interpreted through such a lens (Gopinath 2016) . Modi himself has claimed that demonetisation complemented the swachhbharatabhiyan (clean India campaign) as corruption, black money and terrorism are festering sores, holding India back in the race towards development (Knowledge@Wharton 2016).
The timing of the move, in the middle of the term also highlights an effort to reinvigorate the government and the party. Modi had promise Acche Din and Sabkasaath, sabkavikas (Prosperity and all round development) to all Indian through economic growth and effective governance. The first two years of the government however did not witness the overhauling of economic policy that Modi had promised. As Kala and Bellman (2016) note although the Indian economy was doing good, the strong economic fundamentals did little to lift corporate profits or consumer spending. The economic growth, decreasing inflation, and diminished fiscal deficit under the present government was largely due to the crash in crude oil prices. In real terms railways and ports report on good handled show a decline in tonnage and Index of Industrial production is near zero. Interestingly the public banks in India have been struggling to control a growing mountain of bad debt. As such the move of demonetisation, with potential for windfall gains would have been a strategic move by the government to infuse public investment.
Beyond the posturing of anti-corruption and bold leadership, it is noteworthy that demonetisation has mirrored an effort to create new social alliances by Narendra Modi. The 2014 elections that ushered in the Modi government, was marked by strong inroads by the right wing BJP into rural areas, beyond its traditional support base among urban upper castes and middle-class voters. As Tillin (2015) points out Modi explicitly appealed to an inchoate group he described as India's 'neo-middle classes', many of whom live in rapidly urbanising areas. The BJP and its allies won 80 percent of the 40 most highly urbanised seats and 56 percent of the 123 semi-urban seats. Since scope for further expansion in these sector is limited for the BJP expansion into rural area is the way forward for the party. As such Modi has explicitly focused on improving the situation in rural India and providing relief to the agricultural sector by increasing the social spending manifold. The idea of demonetisation as a burden on the rich and moneyed, rather than the poor has been invoked time and again to consolidate the coalition. Politically the move also resonated the strategy of conflating national interest with actions of the government. While announcing the demonetisation the Prime Minister projected it as a national objective and said that India would have to endure some hardships if it wanted to combat corruption, tax evasion and the menace of black money. The government's and its advocates have projected the strains of demonetisation as a small price and contribution of ordinary citizens for national good. As Tharoor (2016) points out the government's assiduous public relations did its job my conflating standing in queue for money with soldiers standing in guard at the borders. "If our soldiers can stand for hours every day guarding our borders," one popular social media meme asks, "why can't we stand for a few hours in bank queues?" was a common phrase used to justify the problems associated with withdrawing cash.
Politics of Opposition
In a liberal democracy the ability of the government to reap electoral dividends from policy despite failures is directly correlated to the failure of opposition parties. It is the inability of the opposition to come together in a united manner on the streets (despite the posturing of unity within the parliament) that allowed the government some breathing space after demonetisation. Expectedly the Indian National As the data suggests the BJD has gained since the breakdown of the alliance with the BJP in the In the assembly elections in 2016 the Congress received around 12.3 votes (in alliance with Left Front) just 2 percent more than BJP's vote share. In real terms therefore BJP has emerged as the third alternative in the state. Interestingly the BJP vote share declined in 2016, compared to 2014 but this decline did not benefit the Left-Congress alliance in a significant way. Instead TMC's vote percentage increased as minority votes shifted to TMC as the credible bulwark against the BJP. Also the support base of the TMC has largely drawn to rural and urban poor. Its vote share tended to be higher in rural areas, a sign that it has replaced the Left as the "provider party" for the rural poor (Vernier 2016) . Unsurprisingly Mamata Banerjee was most vocal against demonetisation because the principal opposition in the state (CPIM and Congress) opposed the move, and she had to portray herself as a greater, more credible opposition to BJP for the minorities and her traditional vote bank.
Conclusion
In conclusion it is important to point out that demonetisation and its consequences are still unsure, at least economically. The economy has been somewhat destabilised in the short run while the long run benefits can only be anticipated. In the absence of credible economic outcomes, the narrative of demonetisation constructed by political parties has dominated the discourse. That is why states like Delhi and Karnataka despite having comparatively favourable conditions has opposed the move while backward 
